Recent Development and Studies: Public Sector, Information and Incentives

Authors

  • Jan-Erik Lane University of Geneva, Switzerland.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.9734/bpi/mpebm/v2/10080D

Keywords:

Opportunism, shirking, pretending, asymmetrical knowledge, hobbes, montesquieu, public sector

Abstract

A democratic regime would find its rationale ultimately with the people of the country. Their needs of government would be decisive for the means and ends of the state. What is true information in today's world? The hunt for information is on, not only in the private sector - market trends and enterprise data ' bur also on the public sector. Information is strongly linked with incentives: leak news and you have an extra rent. This paper tries to model the crucial role of information and it's incentives in government and it started in the public sector. In the history of political thought we encounter two philosophers who are especially relaxant for the principal-agent framework, viz Hobbes and Montesquieu.

Published

2021-07-12

How to Cite

Jan-Erik Lane. (2021). Recent Development and Studies: Public Sector, Information and Incentives . Modern Perspectives in Economics, Business and Management Vol. 2, 38–44. https://doi.org/10.9734/bpi/mpebm/v2/10080D