Empirical Identity: A Guiding Factor in Theory Selection

Abstract

Coordination theory advocates that scientific criteria can only be established through theory comparison. Theory comparison is not a comparison of logic and content, but a comparison of coordination force, that is, a comparison of theory problem-solving manner and problem-solving strength. There are many theories about theory choice in philosophy of science, but no any indicator of scientific theory has been precisely defined, let alone a united index system. By the example of empirical identity, I shall show that a range of scientific indicators to decide theory choice can be precisely defined by some basic concepts. I think that these indicators can provide us a better description of the principles of philosophy of science. The certain pursuit of theories’ empirical identity and novelty leads the cumulative view of scientific progress; under non-cumulative circumstance, it is totally practicable to judge a theory’s empirical identity as well as empirical novelty; empirical identity underdetermines the acceptance of a particular theory. It is possible that all the principles of philosophy of science could be explained again through the system of index of theory choice, thus a more rigorous theory of philosophy of science could be established. Just as the conflict of empirical identity underdetermines the abandonment of a theory, the coordination of empirical identity also underdetermines the acceptance of a theory. At a certain moment, any single coordination force or local coordination force is underdetermined.